In clear, easy-to-grasp language, the author covers many of the topics that you will need to know in order to win your dream job and be the first in line for a promotion.
We seem to be living at a time when insurance is strained to the breaking point. From hurricanes and earthquakes to terrorist attacks and threats of nuclear devastation, enormous risks to life and property; and accompanying liabilities; proliferate on an unprecedented scale. Insurer insolvency is not yet common, but it is not unusual either. And at the root of such failures often lies the compound failure of uncollectable reinsurance. This important book proposes that a significant part of the emerging insurance crisis results from inadequate regulation of reinsurance.
In a detailed and cogent analysis of what an effective regulatory regime for reinsurance must entail, the author examines such factors as the following:
The author's concluding chapter presents an essential legal infrastructure that allows for efficiency, security, and individual market characteristics. Professor Wang then applies this framework to the Taiwanese insurance market, demonstrating convincingly how his proposed regime can solve specific problems while respecting Taiwan's distinct market environment. As a meticulously considered appraisal of, and solution to, a world problem that is growing quickly and uncontrollably, Reinsurance Regulation will be of immense value to lawyers, professors, academics, and officials who deal with any facet of economic law.
The book examines how the absence of insurance in the past led to some special maritime liability law principles such as 'general average' (i.e., losses or expenses shared by all the parties to a maritime adventure) and the limitation of shipowners' liability. In the absence of insurance, these principles served the function of insurance mostly for shipowners. As commercial marine insurance is now widely available, these principles have lost their justification and may in fact interfere with the most important goal of liability law i.e., deterrence from negligence. The work thus recommends their abolition. It further argues that when insurance is easily available and affordable to the both parties to a liability claim, the main goal of liability law should be deterrence as opposed to compensation. This is exactly the case with the maritime cargo liability claims where both cargo owners and shipowners are invariably insured. As a result, the sole focus of cargo liability law should be and to a great extent, is deterrence. On the other hand in the vessel-source oil pollution liability setting, pollution victims are not usually insured. Therefore oil pollution liability law has to cater both for compensation and deterrence, the two traditional goals of liability law. The final question the work addresses is whether the deterrent effect of liability law is affected by the availability of liability insurance. Contrary to the popular belief the work attempts to prove that the presence of liability insurance is not necessarily a hindrance but can be a complementary force towards the realization of deterrent goal of liability law.